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BRIDGING THE TITLE VII GAP: PROTECTING ALL
WORKERS FROM "WORK AUTHORIZATION"
DISCRIMINATION
BY RACHEL K. ALEXANDER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the numerous laws protecting workers in the United
States, a gap remains that leaves all categories of workers unprotected
under certain circumstances. Many scholars have examined protections
and remedies available to unauthorized immigrant workers, including
existing protections after the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB in 2002.3 Others have
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1. Hereinafter called "unauthorized workers." This Article uses the term "unauthorized
workers" rather than some alternatives such as "illegal" or "undocumented" "immigrants" or
"aliens" for the following reasons. The Article uses the word "worker" in lieu of "immigrant"
or "alien" because this Article is concerned with the intersection of immigration and
workplace law, and is thus specifically concerned with "workers," rather than the immigration
status of people in general. Also, the term "illegal" has a "political charge" that is unnecessary
to the Article's analysis. See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of
Undocumented Workers, 58 Am. U. L. REv. 1361, 1362 n.4 (2009) ("The term [undocumented
worker] is designed to avoid the political charge and semantic difficulties presented by labels
such as "illegal alien" and "undocumented immigrant."). However, the term "undocumented"
worker also presents difficulties because workers may be "documented" and still legally
unauthorized to work, such as those who present fraudulent documents to an employer.
2. 535 U.S. 137 (2002). In Hoffman, the Court concluded "that allowing the [National
Labor Relations] Board to award back-pay to illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit
statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in [the Immigration
Reform and Control Act]. Id. at 151-52. It would encourage the successful evasion of
apprehension by immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the immigration laws,
and encourage future violations. However broad the Board's discretion to fashion remedies
when dealing only with the NLRA, it is not so unbounded as to authorize this sort of an
award." Id.
3. See generally Leticia M. Saucedo, National Origin, Immigrants, and the Workplace:
The Employment Cases in Latinos and the Law and the Advocates' Perspective, 12 HARV.
LATINO L. REv. 53 (2009) [hereinafter National Origin ] (examining the role of advocates
regarding Latinos' workplace rights); Kati L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The
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investigated the impact of an immigrant workforce, including both
authorized and unauthorized workers from a native-born worker's
perspective.4 However, these discussions usually look at remedies
available to unauthorized workers when those workers are subjected to
unlawful wage practices, discrimination, or harassment in violation of
various federal laws.5 Yet, there is a gap in protection when employers
target, directly or indirectly, an unauthorized worker while still
following the letter of workplace law. To avoid such lawful
discrimination, immigration status should be deemed a protected class
in workplace-discrimination law to avoid the disparate impact such
discrimination has on all worker populations, within all racial and
ethnic categories. This paper argues that work-authorization
discrimination should be treated as an unlawful practice under Title
VII's national origin protections
For instance, suppose that A Fictional Construction
Corporation ("AFCC") operates construction sites in Kansas City,
Missouri.6 AFCC seeks to fill jobs for "construction laborers" 7 with
unauthorized workers. It structures two groups of construction
laborers: one group that works for $10.00 per hour and AFCC hopes to
staff with unauthorized workers, ("Group A") and one group that
works for $18.50 per hour ("Group B"), which is the mean hourly
Interstices of Immigration Law and Labor and Employment Law, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J.
125 (2009) (summarizing U.S. law governing documented and undocumented migrant
workers); Leticia M. Saucedo, Addressing Segregation in the Brown Collar Workplace:
Toward a Solution for the Inexorable 100%, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 447 (2008) [hereinafter
Addressing Segregation] (exploring ways to dismantle segregation in the brown collar
workplace); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants:
The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193 (2007) (exploring whether employer
sanctions have deterred illegal immigration and protected the U.S. job market); Irene Zopoth
Hudson & Susan Schenck, Note, America: Land of Opportunity or Exploitation?, 19 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 351 (2002) (offering a solution combining purposes, policies, and
enforcement mechanisms of labor and employment law with immigration law).
4. See generally Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship,
55 UCLA L. REV. 1161 (2008) (exploring the relationship between work and citizenship using
research on African-American and Latino immigrant workers); Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los
Confundidos: De-Conflating Latinos/as' Race and Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 69
(1998) (examining the conflation of Latinos' nationality and race in American law and
society); Simi N. A. Junior, Note, Many Strands: Immigration Reform and the Effect of
Mexican Migration on African American Unemployment, 10 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 487
(2009) (examining the effects of Mexican immigration on African American employment).
5. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
6. This hypothetical is purely fictional and does not and was not intended to resemble
any actual employer.
7. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Standard Occupational Classification, 47-2061
Construction Laborers, http://www.bls.gov/soc/20 I 0/soc47206 I.htm (last modified Mar. 11,
2010).
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wage for construction laborers in the Occupational Code.8 Group B
also receives other employment benefits, such as health insurance.
Despite the differences in compensation that each group receives, the
worker qualifications are the same for both groups. Group A performs
only menial tasks on job sites and, as a result, steers some candidates
toward Group B as "overqualified."
AFCC pays more than minimum wage to Group A, the lower
paid group, and also pays overtime for hours worked over forty per
workweek. 9 AFCC also creates working conditions on the sites where
Group A works that are lawful but unfavorable or less desirable than
the job sites where Group B works. AFCC refrains from harassing or
otherwise discriminating against employees in either group. AFCC has
structured the Group A construction laborers with a suspicion, or
perhaps with an unstated goal, that no "American" or authorized
worker would choose to work in that department and is, as such,
targeting unauthorized workers who will tolerate such conditions.
However, AFCC follows its document-checking requirements in the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and has no direct reason
to know that its workers are not authorized to work in the United
States.10 In short, AFCC follows the letter of workplace law while
taking advantage of some of their workers because of those workers'
lack of documentation and corresponding recourse.
This scenario presents problems for two categories of AFCC's
employees or prospective employees: (1) the unauthorized workers in
Group A who are subjected to the less-favorable wages, benefits, and
job conditions, and (2) other prospective employees (such as a legal
immigrant or U.S. citizen of any race or national origin) who were
refused positions into either group because of AFCC's preference for
hiring, what it presumes to be, unauthorized workers. Under existing
protections within Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," the
unauthorized worker, legal immigrant, or U.S. citizen would only have
rights under Title VII to sue for national origin discrimination. Part II
8. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Occupational Employment Statistics, Occupational
Employment and Wages, May 2008, 47-2061 Construction Laborers,
http://www.bls.gov/oes/2008/may/oes47206 .htm (last modified May 4, 2009).
9. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (2006) (requiring payment of minimum wages and
overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty per workweek, respectively).
10. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101(a)-(c), 100
Stat. 3359, 3360-63 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
IRCA]. The IRCA only requires that employers check that documents reasonably appear valid
on their face. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). See also Griffith, supra note 3, at 139
(describing document-checking and stating, "[d]ocument verification is very subjective.").
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) to 2000(e)(17) (2006).
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of this Article discusses how, in an otherwise lawful employment
relationship (one without discrimination on the basis of sex or age,
harassment, or Fair Labor Standards Actl 2/wage violations), work-
authorization discrimination is not presently an unlawful practice
under Title VII's national origin protections. Part III of this Article
discusses how the narrow scope of Title VII's current provisions
impacts all categories of workers, including unauthorized workers,
legal immigrants, and U.S. citizens.
II. "WORK AUTHORIZATION" IS NOT PRESENTLY A
PROTECTED STATUS.
Many of the scholarly pieces examining work-authorization
discrimination, as well as the few courts that have addressed the issue,
focus on whether "alienage" or "immigration status" is a protected
class under Title VII by virtue of its national origin protections.13
However, for purposes of this Article's analysis, neither "alienage" nor
"immigration status" addresses the problems of: (1) employer biases in
favor of unauthorized workers, (2) an employer's structuring of jobs to
favor, directly or implicitly, unauthorized workers, and
(3) consequential creation of substandard terms and conditions of
employment.
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
13. See, e.g., Ruben J. Garcia, Across the Borders: Immigrant Status and Identity in Law
and Latcrit Theory, 55 FLA. L. REv. 511, 515 (2003) (stating, "[u]nder Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, and ancestry are
prohibited; discrimination on the basis of immigrant status is not prohibited. Immigrants may
receive 'national origin' protection under Title VII, but they do not receive it based on their
immigrant status."); Addressing Segregation, supra note 3, at 468 (stating, "[u]nder traditional
doctrine, cases alleging discrimination based on immigration status do not fall within the
rubric of national origin discrimination."). For court decisions, see, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah
Mfg. Co., Inc. 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973) (stating, "[a]liens are protected from illegal
discrimination under the Act, but nothing in the Act makes it illegal to discriminate on the
basis of citizenship or alienage."); Andonissamy v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 547 F.3d 841, 850-
51 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that a reference to "immigrant status" insufficient to state a claim
for national origin discrimination); Udoeyop v. Accessible Space, Inc., No. 08-4743
(JNE/JJK), 2008 WL 4681389, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2008) (quoting Espinoza, 414 U.S. at
95) (bracket in original) (stating, "[t]he alleged consideration of Udoeyop's immigrant status
does not support Udoeyop's discrimination claims because 'nothing in [Title VII] makes it
illegal to discriminate on the basis of citizenship or alienage."'); DePayan v. Wend-Rockies,
Inc., No. 07-cv-02520-LTB-MEH, 2008 WL 2168780, at *4 (D.Colo. May 21, 2008) (stating,
"[h]owever, any discrimination on the basis of Plaintiffs alleged status as a citizen is also not
cognizable as citizenship is not a protected class under Title VII."); Rojas v. City of New
Brunswick, No. 04-3195 (WHW), 2008 WL 2355535, at *27 (D.N.J. June 4, 2008) (quoting
Mattus v. Facility Solutions, Inc., No. 05-0863, 2005 WL 3132190, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 21,
2005)) (stating, "'[t]he prohibition of discrimination based on national origin does not prohibit
discrimination on the ground of citizenship."').
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A series of illustrations follow to help clarify these points. An
applicant who is refused a job at an employer's facility where "alien"
or "citizen" workers are favored may well be protected under Title
VII's national origin protections.14 If the employer favors alien
workers, the applicant may have a race discrimination claim
(depending on the racial category of both the favored employee and
the rejected applicant). Similarly, a native-born applicant would likely
have a national origin claim against an employer who favors "alien" or
"immigrant" workers because the disfavored characteristic is truly
national origin-origination in the United States.' 5 A legal immigrant
or naturalized citizen may have a national origin claim against an
employer who favors native-born workers because it is the applicant's
actual national origin that prevented the employment relationship. A
legal immigrant might have a national origin claim against an
employer who favors citizens because, again, the disfavored
characteristic is national origin-origination in a country other than
the United States. Thus, the characterization of "alienage" or
"immigration status"1 6 is incomplete to the extent that it excludes an
employer who favors one type of immigrant (unauthorized) over
another (authorized) or over native-born workers. If an employer
targets an unauthorized worker from Guatemala over a legal
immigrant or naturalized citizen originally from Guatemala, there is no
difference in national origin. The gap in coverage is further
complicated by the fact that national origin, unlike ethnic traits or
other characteristics, is frequently imperceptible.17
Although scholars have concluded that unauthorized workers
are entitled to protections under Title VII and similar anti-
14. See, e.g., Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 95 (stating, "[c]ertainly it would be unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against aliens because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
-- for example, by hiring aliens of Anglo-Saxon background but refusing to hire those of
Mexican or Spanish ancestry. Aliens are protected from illegal discrimination under the Act,
but nothing in the Act makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of citizenship or alienage.").
15. Courts have recognized the availability of "reverse discrimination" claims in Title
VII cases. See, e.g., Adamson v. Multi Cmty. Diversified Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1141
(10th Cir. 2008) (noting that employee's claim was better analyzed as one for reverse
discrimination); Henry v. Jones, 507 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2007) (outlining prima facie case
for reverse discrimination); Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 851 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (outlining elements of reverse discrimination claim).
16. "Alienage" refers to one's status as an alien, and "immigration status" refers to one's
status as an immigrant irrespective of legality.
17. See Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin"
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805, 835 (1994) ("Discrimination,
therefore, is more likely to occur against persons because of the perceptible manifestations of
ethnic distinction, ethnic traits, than because of the often imperceptible fact of national
origin.").
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discrimination laws when an employer discriminates on the basis of
something other than immigrant status (such as race, sex, or religion)
most have also recognized that unauthorized workers are simply not
entitled to protection based on their immigrant status.18 For instance,
Professor Garcia explained:
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, discrimination
on the basis of race, color, national origin, and ancestry
are prohibited; discrimination on the basis of immigrant
status is not prohibited. Immigrants may receive
"national origin" protection under Title VII, but they do
18. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 3, at 160-61 (discussing unauthorized workers who are
paid less than minimum wage or are discriminated against based on a class in Title VII but are
afraid to make complaint); Ellinor R. Coder, Comment, The Homeland Security Safe-Harbor
Procedure for Social Security No-Match Letters: A Mismatched Immigration Enforcement
Tool, 86 N.C. L. REV. 493, 503 n.59 (2008) (stating "undocumented workers may take
advantage of Title VIi's protections even though the statute does not protect discrimination
based on alienage, which is a person's status as a non-citizen. . . . Rather than claim
discrimination based on alienage, undocumented workers may allege discrimination on one of
the other protected classes, such as national origin, race, or sex.") (internal citations omitted);
Jun Roh, Comment, The Aftermath of September Eleventh: Increased Exploitation of
Undocumented Workers in the Workplace, 5 WYo. L. REV. 237, 257 (2005) (noting "with this
focus on controlling employee's conduct, employers have subjected undocumented workers to
various forms of discrimination prohibited by Title VII, including discrimination based on
race, national origin, pregnancy, religion, and sex, after they hired undocumented workers.").
However, a practitioner in the area has described three types of unlawful discrimination based
on citizenship or alienage, stating:
By way of background, national origin discrimination refers to practices that treat individuals
differently based on their country of birth, the place from where their ancestors came, or their
accents. Citizenship discrimination includes treating someone differently because of their
immigration status. However, the citizenship discrimination provisions are not as broad as
they first appear. The citizenship discrimination provisions only protect the following classes
of individuals: permanent residents, temporary residents, asylees, refugees, and U.S. citizens.
Non-exclusive examples of citizenship or immigration status discrimination include employers
who only hire U.S. citizens (or U.S. citizens and green card holders only), employers who
refuse to hire asylees or refugees because their employment authorization documents contain
expiration dates, and employers who prefer to employ unauthorized workers or temporary visa
holders rather than U.S. citizens and other workers with employment authorization (often
referred to as 'reverse discrimination').
David W. Gearhart, This is not Normal Hiring: Best Practices for Employing Highly Skilled
Foreign Nationals, in EMPLOYING HIGHLY SKILLED FOREIGN NATIONALS: LEADING LAWYERS
ON COUNSELING CLIENTS, OBTAINING H-lB VISAS, AND DEVELOPING A SUCCESSFUL
IMMIGRATION STRATEGY (INSIDE THE MINDS) (Aspatore, 2009). See also Rebecca Smith, Amy
Sugimori, & Luna Yasui, Low Pay, High Risk: State Models for Advancing Immigrant
Workers' Rights, 28 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 597, 600 n.29 (2004) (quoting Office of
Chief Economist, U.S. Dep't of Agric., IRCA Antidiscrimination Provisions, at
http://www.usda.gov/oce/labor/ina.htm (last modified May 16, 2006)) (repeating that one type
of citizenship status discrimination includes "employers who prefer to employ unauthorized
workers or temporary visa holders rather than U.S. citizens and other workers with
employment authorization").
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not receive it based on their immigrant status. Proving
the national origin claim often requires plaintiffs to
show that their discriminator bore some hostility toward
their particular nation of origin or ancestry, as opposed
to a general, undefined animus toward "newcomers" or
"illegals."l 9
Similarly, Professor Saucedo noted, as part of her series of
"brown-collar workplace" articles "[u]nder traditional doctrine, cases
alleging discrimination based on immigration status do not fall within
the rubric of national origin discrimination." 20  Other scholars
recognize that unauthorized workers are not part of a protected class
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.21
Courts have similarly found that both unauthorized-worker
plaintiffs and native-born plaintiffs failed to state claims for national
origin discrimination based on immigration status. For instance, in
Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co,22 the United States Supreme
Court determined:
We agree that aliens are protected from discrimination
under [Title VII]. . . . The question posed in the present
case, however, is not whether aliens are protected from
illegal discrimination under the Act, but what kinds of
discrimination the Act makes illegal. Certainly it would
be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against
aliens because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin-for example, by hiring aliens of Anglo-Saxon
background but refusing to hire those of Mexican or
Spanish ancestry. Aliens are protected from illegal
discrimination under the Act, but nothing in the Act
19. Garcia, supra note 13, at 515 (internal citations omitted).
20. Addressing Segregation, supra note 3, at 468 (internal citation omitted).
21. See Gregory A. Odegaard, A Yes or No Answer: A Plea to End the
Oversimplification of the Debate on Licensing Aliens, 24 J.L. & POL. 435, 467-68 (2008)
(quoting Cubas v. Martinez, 33 A.D.3d 96, 113 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)) (relaying "[r]ather, the
Court followed United States v. Toner, which it summarized as noting that 'illegal aliens [are
not] a protected class so as to require the government to establish anything more than a
rational basis for enacting the statute."') (brackets in original) (internal citations omitted);
Youngro Lee, Note, To Dream or Not to Dream: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Development,
Relief and Education for Alien Minors (Dream) Act, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 231, 244
(2006) (stating "[s]ince undocumented immigrants are not a constitutionally protected group,
the legislature and the courts are not bound by the strict scrutiny standard.").
22. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
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makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of
citizenship or alienage.23
Accordingly, federal circuit and district courts have followed
suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
dismissed an employee's claim for retaliation because he had failed to
show that he engaged in protected activity by complaining about his
employer's remarks regarding his immigration status. 24 The court
determined that such remarks did not constitute evidence of national
origin discrimination. 25
Likewise, in DePayan v. Wend-Rockies,26 the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed a native-born
employee's claim that her employer treated her allegedly unauthorized
coworkers more favorably in violation of Title VII and on the basis of
national origin.27 The DePayan court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court's
conclusion in Espinoza, holding "[i]n [the] context of Title VII, that
national origin refers to 'country where a person was born, or, more
broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came,' and
therefore 'Congress did not intend the term 'national origin' to
embrace citizenship requirements,"' 28 The DePayan court also referred
to another court's decision which concluded that "Title VII does not
apply to employment discrimination on basis of alienage."29 Other
courts have reached similar conclusions in cases involving claims of
discrimination on the basis of alienage for both legal immigrants and
unauthorized workers.30
Unfortunately, these courts likely reached the correct legal
conclusion because Title VII, as presently worded, does not protect
employees based on immigration status or, for purposes of this Article,
work-authorization status. These cases likely reached the correct
conclusion about an absence of protection based on alienage because
of Title VII's plain wording and what many scholars have termed a
23. Id at 95 (emphasis added).
24. See Andonissamy v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 547 F.3d 841, 850-51 (7th Cir. 2008).
25. See id. at 851.
26. No. 07-cv-02520-LTB-MEH, 2008 WL 2168780 (D. Colo. May 21, 2008).
27. See id. at *4.
28. Id. (quoting Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc. 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973)).
29. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Wendy's of Colorado Springs, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 1375, 1381
n.5 (D. Colo. 1989)).
30. See, e.g., Udoeyop v. Accessible Space, Inc., No. 08-4743 (JNE/JJK), 2008 WL
4681389, at *2 (D.Minn. Oct. 21, 2008) (plaintiff was lawful immigrant); Rojas v. City of
New Brunswick, No. 04-3195 (WHW), 2008 WL 2355535, at *26-27 (D.N.J. June 4, 2008)
(plaintiff was allegedly an unauthorized immigrant).
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"meager" legislative history.31 Prior to Title VII's enactment, the term
"national origin" had been used in both legislative and executive
actions. 32 With regard to the term's use in Title VII, the legislative
history boils down to "a few unilluminating paragraphs of the House
debate."33 The term was likely included because it was part of a prior
body of "boilerplate" language used in those prior enactments.3 4 When
enacting Title VII, Congress understood that national origin meant a
person's nation of birth or the nations of birth of a person's
ancestors, 35 and did not bother to delve further into the meaning of this
categorization.
However, as noted above, even if the term "national origin" or
its legislative history in Title VII were broad enough to encompass
discrimination on the basis of alienage or citizenship, it would still be
too narrow to provide protections to workers discriminated against
because of their status, non-status, or perceived status as unauthorized
workers.36 As Professor Saucedo recounted "[h]istorically, workplace
law did not concern itself with immigration status in determining who
was a 'worker.' It was not until 1986, with the passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act . .. that Congress succeeded in
explicitly inserting immigration regulation into the workplace." 37
31. See Sandrino-Glasser, supra note 4, at 136 n.279 (citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.,
Inc. 414 U.S. 86, 89 (1973)); Perea, supra note 17, at 821 (quoting Espinoza v. Farah Mfg.
Co., Inc. 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973)).
32. See Perea, supra note 17, at 810-12. Perhaps the ironic part of Title VII's national
origin protections is that "national origin" was a concept originally derived from immigration
laws (national origin quotas), and yet "national origin" under Title VII does not protect
immigrants. Id. at 811.
33. Id. at 807 (citing U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Legislative History
of Titles VII and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 3179-81 (1968)).
34. Id. at 807, 811 (citing Exec. Order No. 10,590, 20 Fed. Reg. 409 (Jan. 19, 1955);
Exec. Order No. 9,980, 13 Fed. Reg. 4311 (July 28,1948)).
35. See id. at 807, 821. See also Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia
Cousins Lost Their Accents: Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving
English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal
Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347, 1386 (1997) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2549 (1964)
(remarks of Rep. Roosevelt)).
36. At least two federal courts have limited protections even further by determining that
Title VII does not protect workers who are discriminated against because of the employer's
perception of the worker's race or national origin. See Uddin v. Universal Avionics Sys.
Corp., No. 1:05-CV-lll5-TWT, 2006 WL 1835291, at *6 (N.D.Ga. June 30, 2006) (stating,
"Title VII does not explicitly protect persons who are perceived to belong to a protected
class"); Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (finding summary
judgment appropriate because Title VII does not include claims for perceived race or national
origin discrimination).
37. National Origin, supra note 3, at 59 (citing Pub. L. No. 99-603, §§ 101-103, 100
Stat. 3359, 3360-80 (1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a-1324b (2006) and 18
U.S.C. § 1546 (2006)).
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This gap in protection has grown troubling as employers have
become savvier about immigration and workplace law.38 Most
employers are sophisticated enough to avoid overt discrimination
prohibited by state and federal law. Part of this sophistication allows
employers to structure jobs, usually lawfully, to favor a particular
employee over another.40 As several scholars have noted, some
employers prefer immigrant workers, especially unauthorized
workers. 41  This preference has been fueled by a common
misperception that they will take jobs "no one else wants" or "no one
else will do." 42 It is the employers' sophistication about workplace law
and corresponding ability to structure jobs implicitly targeting
unauthorized workers that highlights the gap in Title VII's current
protections for all workers.
Scholarly research illuminates that employers' preferences for
various types of workers is rooted in prejudice and discriminatory
intent. As Professors Gordon and Lenhardt noted, in examining racial
tension between African Americans and immigrants:
Social scientists who have studied employer attitudes
toward African Americans concur that employers have
considerable prejudice against native-born black
workers. Some of this bias extends to U.S.-born
workers of all races and ethnicities and is rooted in the
belief that native workers do not want to work hard."4 3
They continued, "[iln contrast, employers have an
38. See Perea, supra note 17, at 860.
39. See id.
40. See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 4, at 1176-77 (citing Leticia M. Saucedo, The
Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Making of the Brown Collar
Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961, 973-76 (2006) [hereinafter Subservient Worker]; other
citation omitted).
41. See, e.g.,Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 4, at 1175-76; Wishnie, supra note 3, at
213-14.
42. See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 4, at 1176-77 (quoting Saucedo, Addressing
Segregation, supra note 3, at 450) For example, in 2001, then-President Bush "criticized
sanctioning employers for hiring 'somebody [who] is willing to do . . . work . . . others in
America aren't willing to do."' Hudson & Schenck, supra note 3, at 362-63 (citation omitted).
43. Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 4, at 1174-75 (citing Joleen Kirschenman &
Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them, But...": The Meaning of Race for
Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 204, 210 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson
eds., 1991); ROGER WALDINGER & MICHAEL 1. LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS:
IMMIGRATION AND THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOR, 157-59,166-67, 176-78, (2003);
Devah Pager & Lincoln Quillian, Walking the Talk? What Employers Say Versus What They
Do, 70 Am. Soc. REv. 355, 366 (2005); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhill Mullainathan, Are
Emily and Brenda More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination, 94 AM. EcoN. REV. 991, 992-93 (2004)) (internal citations omitted).
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overwhelmingly positive view of new immigrants -
positive, that is to say, to the extent that subservience is
characterized as a positive trait in low-wage jobs
offering few opportunities for advancement.44
As Professor Wishnie posited, employers who obey
immigration and workplace laws are at a competitive disadvantage to
employers who hire unauthorized workers.45 He found that "[b]ecause
the risk of being fined for an IRCA [Immigration Reform and Control
Act] violation is slight and the cost-savings from employing and
exploiting an [unauthorized] worker potentially substantial (all the
more so since Hoffman4 6), unscrupulous employers have not hesitated
to hire undocumented workers and to seize the unfair competitive
advantage such a practice allows."47
Although exploitation of unauthorized workers is undoubtedly
a concern, unauthorized workers have rights under the various labor
and employment laws against unlawful practices including: wage
violations, discrimination, and unlawful working conditions.4 ' And,
although the voices rising in support against the exploitation of
unauthorized workers may have come too late and may not be
sufficient, unauthorized workers have found means to combat such
exploitation.49 However, a problem still exists when employers
structure jobs to prefer and ultimately hire unauthorized workers -
many victim groups suffer because authorization to work in the United
States is not a protected trait under Title VII.
III. ALL WORKERS, REGARDLESS OF IMMIGRATION STATUS,
CAN BE VICTIMS OF WORK AUTHORIZATION
DISCRIMINATION.
Although a majority of literature on the interplay between
immigration status and national origin protections under Title VII
focuses on the impact on unauthorized workers, many scholars agree
44. Id. (citing WALDINGER & LICHTER, supra note 42, at 144, 160-63; Saucedo,
Subservient Worker, supra note 40, at 978-79).
45. Wishnie, supra note 3, at 213.
46. See discussion on Hoffman, supra note 2.
47. Wishnie, supra note 3, at 213 (citing Brief Amici Curiae of Employers and
Employer Organizations in Support of the NLRB et al., *7-9, Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00-1595) 2001 WL 1631729.
48. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Saucedo, National Origin, supra note 3, at 53; Griffith, supra note 3, at
155 (stating "in the last decade, advocacy on behalf of migrant workers has intensified.").
2010] 209
210 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 10:2
that discrimination of this type hurts all employees or prospective
employees involved.50 Furthermore, there exists a "demonstrated
ability of employers to structure a job so that no native-born worker
will want it" and, as a result, "the workers who are entering the job
market for the newly restructured jobs do not have a cause of action,
while the workers who do not get hired into the jobs, have little
interest in fighting for them."5' In other words, unauthorized workers
who obtain newly structured positions have no recourse because the
employers are not discriminating against them based on any criterion
other than their real or perceived lack of authorization to work in the
United States and their willingness to take a job so structured.
Likewise, the native-born worker, regardless of national origin,
may not be interested in pursuing a claim for wrongful failure to hire
because the job in question is not attractive enough. However, all
employees in this scenario have been discriminated against, and
without expansion of the concept of national origin or some other
amendment to Title VII, these workers will continue without recourse.
Therefore, the remainder of this Article discusses the particular impact
on unauthorized workers, legal immigrants, native-born workers of the
same race or ancestral national origin as the targeted unauthorized
workers, and other native-born workers such as Caucasians and
African Americans.52
A. IMPACT ON UNAUTHORIZED WORKERS
Many scholars have theorized the repercussions of not
affording protections to unauthorized workers pursuant to the Supreme
Court's decision in Hoffman or under other rationales. However,
when employers engage in an otherwise-lawful employment
relationship with unauthorized workers, a gap in protection exists
50. See, e.g., Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 1, at 1365 (concluding that "restricting
workplace protections based on [immigration] status harms citizens as well as immigrants);
Marianne Staniunas, Comment, All Employees Are Equal, But Some Employees Are More
Equal Than Others, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 393, 423 (2004) (reasoning, "[t]herefore,
policies and laws that determine-or limit-the rights of undocumented immigrants directly
affect the rights and lives of all U.S. residents. Even if one can make arguments against
extending full legal protections to undocumented immigrants, one cannot ignore the
repercussions of such policy decisions on the United States as a whole"); Hudson & Schenck,
supra note 3, at 378 (arguing "[t]he exploitation of undocumented workers adversely affects
the work environment of documented workers, who may remain silent when their own rights
are violated for fear of being replaced by undocumented employees").
51. Saucedo, Addressing Segregation, supra note 3, at 494-95.
52. See supra Part II.
53. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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because Title VII does not protect them as a group.54 This is
particularly problematic because the employer-sanctions provisions
contained within IRCA have not motivated employers to refrain from
hiring unauthorized workers." On the contrary, as Professor Wishnie
contended, the employment of unauthorized workers has become
"irresistible in low-wage, labor-intensive industries."5 6  This is
especially true because the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman, in
some respects, "insulated" employers from liability for hiring
unauthorized workers because it limited the remedies to which
unauthorized workers are entitled.
Recent immigration statistics support these rationales. For
instance, the Pew Hispanic Center estimates that 11.9 million
unauthorized immigrants were living in the United States as of 2008
and that there were 8.3 million unauthorized workers in the United
States workforce as of March 2008. These statistics are particularly
significant in certain industries. For example, unauthorized workers
comprised the following percentages of total workers in various
industries: fourteen percent of food-manufacturing workers, thirteen
percent of agricultural and furniture-manufacturing workers, twelve
percent of construction, textile-manufacturing, and food-services
workers, and ten percent of commercial-lodging or accommodation
54. See supra Part II.
55. See Wishnie, supra note 3, at 213; see Roh, supra note 18, at 265 (stating, "[clurrent
law does not successfully protect undocumented workers or deter illegal immigration.");
Garcia, supra note 13, at 526 (stating, "[d]espite the legal constraints on the behavior of
employers and immigrants, law has not changed . . . the propensity of employers to violate the
NLRA and IRCA with respect to immigrants. . ."); Elizabeth M. Dunne, Comment, The
Embarrassing Secret of Immigration Policy: Understanding Why Congress Should Enact an
Enforcement Statute for Undocumented Workers, 49 EMORY L.J. 623, 626-27 (2000)) (stating,
"[h]owever, 'the employer sanctions scheme has done little to rectify the 'embarrassing secret'
of immigration--that illegal immigrants play an invaluable role in our daily lives"').
56. Wishnie, supra note 3, at 215.
57. See id. at 214 (stating "[t]he Hoffman decision has intensified this dynamic, making
it absolutely clear that employers of undocumented workers are in many instances immune
from ordinary labor law liability"). For literature further discussing Hoffman and its impact,
see Nhan T. Vu & Jeff Schwartz, Workplace Rights and Illegal Immigration: How Implied
Repeal Analysis Cuts Through the Haze of Hoffman Plastic, its Predecessors and its Progeny,
29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2008); Mariel Martinez, The Hoffman Aftermath:
Analyzing the Plight of the Undocumented Worker Through a "Wider Lens," 7 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 661 (2005); Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for Protecting Undocumented Workers in the
Title VII Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 473 (2005).
58. Jeffrey S. Passel & D'Vera Cohn, Pew Hispanic Ctr., A Portrait of Unauthorized
Immigrants in the United States, (2009), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf.
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workers. 59 Indeed, it has been estimated that nearly eighty-five percent
of "newly arrived" workers are actually unauthorized to work in the
United States.60
As Professor Keith Cunningham-Parmeter stated:
Unauthorized immigrants live in precarious times.
American demand for inexpensive goods draws
international migrants to our factories and fields.
Developing nations encourage their people to work in
the United States. As they are pushed and pulled toward
the country, immigrants arrive in the United States to
find armed Minutemen at the border and a growing
public distaste for the unauthorized arrivals. They are
wanted yet disdained, needed yet derided. 6'
Likewise, there exists a perception that unauthorized workers
feel they have no choice but to enter the country illegally,62 and it is
difficult to become "authorized" to work in the United States given
current immigration regulations. 63
In addition to the myth that unauthorized workers will take jobs
no one else wants,64 there exists a corollary myth: "the immigrant
success story myth." Professor Saucedo explains:
The "immigrant success story" myth portrays the
immigrant as starting at the bottom of the economic
59. The Perryman Group, An Essential Resource: An Analysis of the Economic Impact
of Undocumented Workers on Business Activity in the US with Estimated Effects by State
and by Industry 33 (2008), available at http://www.ilw.com/articles/2008,1008-perryman.pdf
(citing Pew Hispanic Ctr., Research Report: The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized
Migrant Population in the US 14 (2006)).
60. Saucedo, Subservient Worker, supra note 40, at 966 (citing RAKESH KOCHHAR, PEW
HISPANIC CTR., SURVEY OF MEXICAN MIGRANTS: THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION TO AMERICA 1,
16 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/58.pdf; JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW
HISPANIC CTR., ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNDOCUMENTED
POPULATION 1 (2005), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/44.pdf).
61. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 1, at 1362.
62. See Junior, supra note 4, at 518.
63. See Saucedo, Subservient Worker, supra note 40, at 968 (citing Immigration and
Nationality Act §§ 203(b)(3)(A)(iii), 203(b)(3)(B) (2000)).
64. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also Saucedo, Subservient Worker,
supra note 40, at 973 (noting that "[t]he myth [that brown-collar workers will take or choose
jobs no one else wants] has an important and overlooked side effect, however, in that it
perpetuates the idea that interest in, and decisions about, which jobs to take lie solely with the
employee. It masks the power that employers have to create the jobs that no one else will take
and target brown collar workers for those jobs").
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ladder and moving up in steady progression over time.
It allows for the popular perception that, with time, the
brown collar worker will assimilate and move up the
economic ladder if only he desires to do so. In other
words, should the immigrant choose to invest in his
own human capital, he will not suffer harmful
workplace conditions for long. As with the corollary
myth of the unwanted job, however, the immigrant
success story does not consider the degree to which
brown collar workers' choices are constrained by social
and legal policies. Nor does it acknowledge how
employers take advantage of those constraints to
develop a segmented market that inhibits job
advancement opportunities. 65
This myth perpetuates the problems associated with
unauthorized workers and employer-structured jobs because
unauthorized workers might believe that if they can suffer inferior
wages and conditions for a period of time, they will be promoted into
the preferred and higher-paying jobs. Because these workers do not
have recourse to act under Title VII when their employer targets them
for jobs and otherwise structures those jobs lawfully despite lower
wages and poorer conditions, they end up trapped in inferior jobs with
nowhere to go.
B. IMPA CT ON A UTHORIZED-IMMTGRANT WORKERS
The issue with immigrant workers who are authorized to work
in the United States is that immigration status and, generally, national
origin are imperceptible characteristics. 66 As a result, they are
frequently categorized with unauthorized workers and may be
perceived as such.67 Although many scholars specifically focus on the
65. Saucedo, Subservient Worker, supra note 40, at 974-75.
66. See Perea, supra note 17, at 835 (stating "[d]iscrimination, therefore, is more likely
to occur against persons because of the perceptible manifestations of ethnic distinction, ethnic
traits, than because of the often imperceptible fact of national origin").
67. See Saucedo, Subservient Worker, supra note 40, at 966 (reasoning "[o]ne of the
defining characteristics of brown collar workers is their 'newly arrived' status. Several
elements of newly arrived status, including perceived immigration status, lack of knowledge
about workplace rights, political disenfranchisement, 'push' factors, language deficiencies, and
fear of job loss or deportation, or both, combine to create an especially vulnerable
workforce"). Professor Saucedo remarked, "[t]hese sets of Latino workers-newly arrived,
earlier arrived, and native born workers who fit the profile of the vulnerable worker-together
suffer the fate of the brown collar worker. From the employer's point of view, earlier arrived
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impact on Latino workers, it is important to remember that
unauthorized and authorized immigrant workers come from countries
around the world.68  Although about seventy-six percent of
unauthorized immigrants in the United States are Hispanic and nearly
fifty-nine percent are from Mexico, approximately eleven percent are
from Asia, eleven percent are from Central America, seven percent are
from South America, four percent are from the Caribbean, and less
than two percent are from the Middle East.69 However, no matter
where they were born, "[t]he exploitation of undocumented workers
adversely affects the work environment of documented workers, who
may remain silent when their own rights are violated for fear of being
replaced by undocumented employees."70 As one student scholar
notes"[n]either national origin nor race claims can shield a Mexican
legal permanent resident from employer preferences for undocumented
Mexican immigrants."n
C. IMPACT ON NATIVE-BORN WORKERS OF THE SAME
ANCESTRAL NATIONAL ORIGIN AS TARGETED UNAUTHORIZED
WORKERS
Because immigrant status and national origin, generally, are
imperceptible, native-born workers of a certain race or ancestral
national origin are often perceived as immigrants or even
unauthorized-immigrant workers.72 The reality is that not only are
many Latinos in the United States "native born" in the sense that their
own national origin is the United States, but many Latinos are
ancestrally native born also.73 This is problematic because, as
Professor Saucedo discussed, native-born Latinos can be grouped into
and some native born Latinos are all part of the brown collar supply of labor for the
"unwanted" jobs, even though they do not quite fit the brown collar profile completely." Id.
68. See Sandrino-Glasser, supra note 4, at 79 (quoting Pastora San Juan Cafferty, The
"New" Immigration, in HISPANICS IN THE UNITED STATES: A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA 35-36
(Pastora San Juan Safety & William C. Macready eds., 1985)) (stating, "[i]llegal immigrants
are not solely Mexicans, 'the others come from other countries, including Korea, Taiwan and
the Philippines. Immigration is perceived as Mexican immigration because of the emphasis
placed on apprehending Mexican immigrants"').
69. PASSEL & COHN, supra note 58.
70. Hudson & Schenck, supra note 3, at 378.
71. Rachel Bloomekatz, Rethinking Immigration Status Discrimination and Exploitation
in the Low- Wage Workplace, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1963, 1984 (2007).
72. See supra notes 16 and 65 and accompanying text.
73. See Ruiz Cameron, supra note 35, at 1360 (stating "[b]ut many present-day Latinos
are not the descendants of immigrants, at least as we commonly use the term; rather, they are
the children of ancestors who had settled the New World centuries before Anglos first arrived
in the Southwest").
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inferior jobs with newly arrived and later-arrived immigrants.74 Thus,
in the hypothetical scenario with employer AFCC described in Part I,
if AFCC targeted unauthorized Latino workers for its Group A
construction laborers, and a native-born Latino applied for a job,
AFCC could either refuse to hire the applicant or relegate the applicant
to one of the lower-paid Group A positions.
The meaning and application of the term "national origin" can
also be problematic because "national origin" can mean either one's
own country of birth or that of one's ancestors.75 Thus, people seeking
protection based on "national origin" under Title VII may claim either
their own country of birth or their ancestors' country of birth.
However, when prospective plaintiffs are native born to the United
States, they must then rely on their ancestor's national origin. As
Professor Perea discusses:
Implicit in this claim of a distinguishable national
origin is the assertion that she and/or her ancestors are
of a different, non-American national origin or country
of birth. However, persons born in the United States
have American or United States national origin because
this is their country of birth. Accordingly, citizens,
other than naturalized citizens, who are plaintiffs in a
"national origin" discrimination suit must invoke the
ancestry of their parents or some earlier ancestor to find
a country of birth, a national origin, different from the
United States.76
Professor Perea continues,
Because of its focus on either a fictional difference in
national origin or on ancestry, the "national origin"
language of the statute forces plaintiffs to define
themselves as outsiders, belonging to some other
country or place of birth and, correspondingly, outside
the scope of American identity. By reinforcing the
notion of "foreign national origin" even among
American born citizens, at least two negative
consequences result. First, United States citizens who
constitute part of the American polity and part of
74. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
75. Perea, supra note 17, at 821.
76. Id. at 853-54.
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American identity must define themselves as having a
foreign national origin and as outsiders not belonging to
the American community. This is a false, statutorily-
created outsider status, since Americans born here all
have equal claim to American national origin and to
equal citizenship as a birth right. Second, the operation
of the national origin language of the statute reinforces
unstated norms of "true" American identity. The term
"national origin" operates to reinforce an
underinclusive conception of American identity. 77
This is significant both for the psychological and social costs,
but it can also be significant in the situation forming the basis of this
Article: an employer who structures positions to favor those it
perceives to be unauthorized workers. If a native-born employee
cannot claim national origin discrimination because the favored class
is "unauthorized workers," he or she has no Title VII claim. This
leaves the employee with the possibility of claiming disparate impact
on his or her racial group, such as Latinos. However, compensatory
and punitive damages are not available on disparate impact claims and,
as such, native-born workers' recourse is limited even further. 7 8
D. IMPACT ON NATIVE-BORN WORKERS NOT OF THE SAME
NATIONAL ORIGIN AS TARGETED UNAUTHORIZED WORKERS
The consensus amongst social scientists and other scholars is
that the impact immigrant workers have on native-born workers is
undetermined. 79 As Professor Kati Griffith summarized recently:
Some [studies] find that migrant workers have
increasingly "caused a major competitive problem" for
U.S. workers and may have reduced wage rates of some
domestic workers. Others point out that, at the
aggregate level, migrant workers do not negatively
affect labor conditions for domestic workers. Much of
77. Id. at 854-55 (internal citations omitted).
78. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 1, at 1385 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b) (2006)).
79. See infra text accompanying note 82.
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this debate centers on "whether low-income [domestic]
workers are hurt a lot or just a little."80
No matter what impact immigrant workers actually have on the
American workplace, the perception, particularly fostered by the
American media, is that unauthorized and other immigrant workers
have a negative effect on native-born workers' opportunities. For
example, one student scholar noted:
As the U.S. strives to compete in the global economy, it
is incumbent on the U.S. to maximize the potential of
all U.S. citizens rather than continuing to marginalize
them. As our society becomes increasingly diverse, this
need will become more pressing. The statistics included
in this note do not prove that African Americans are
being replaced by Mexican immigrants, but they do
suggest that when given a choice, employers in service
sector jobs are increasingli choosing immigrants
instead of African Americans.
Professors Gordon and Lenhardt recognized the role the media
plays in the perception, right or wrong, that native-born workers
compete with immigrant workers, and particularly "Latino
newcomers," stating:
A growing population of Latino newcomers in areas
and industries once dominated by African Americans
has, we are told, left the two groups "competing for the
same dry bone," turning the workplace into a "war"
between "rivals": "the black jobless poor" and "the
Latino working poor." Although a few pieces highlight
80. Griffith, supra note 3, at 127-28 (bracketed material in original) (citing and quoting
Paul Weiler, ComparativeEnhancing Worker Lives through Fairer Labor and Worklife Law in
Comparative Perspective, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & Pot'Y J. 143, 147 (2003)); George J. Borjas,
The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on
the Labor Market, 118 QUART. J. OF ECoN. 1335 (2003); Bruce Stokes, The Lost Wages of
Immigration, NAT'L J., Jan. 7, 2006; David Card, Is the New Immigration Really So Bad?, 115
ECON. J. 300, 300-23 (2005); Simonetta Longhi, Peter Nijkamp, & Jacques Poot, A Meta-
Analytic Assessment of the Effect of Immigration on Wages, 19 J. OF ECON. SuRVEYS, 451, 472
(2005); Jonathan G. Goodrich, Help Wanted: Looking for a Visa System that Promotes the
U.S. Economy and National Security, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 975, 991 n.131 (2008); Gordon &
Lenhardt, supra note 4, at 1183; Roger Lowenstein, The Immigration Equation, NY TIMES
MAG., July 7, 2006, at 36.
81. Junior, supra note 4, at 520.
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efforts at collaboration, the overall tenor is neatly
summed up by the headline of a recent front-page
Christian Science Monitor article: "Rising Black-Latino
Clash on Jobs." 82
Although much of the literature on this matter concerns the
interrelationship of immigrant workers and African-American
workers, when looking at the context presented in this Article-an
employer who structures jobs to target unauthorized workers but
maintains an otherwise-lawful employment relationship-all native-
born workers are at risk. Irrespective of whether the perception that
immigrant workers negatively impact native-born workers is accurate,
the perception fuels conflict and litigation. It is frequently the case that
native-born workers sue their employers for national origin
discrimination because the employer favors some other group of
employee, such as an unauthorized worker.83
For example, the United States Supreme Court, in DeCanas v.
Bica,84 determined that a state statute forbidding employment of
unauthorized workers "if such employment would have an adverse
effect on lawful resident workers," was not preempted by federal
immigration law and was therefore not unconstitutional.8 5 In DeCanas,
a group of citizen-employees sued their employer for allegedly
favoring unauthorized workers in violation of that state statute. 86 Many
other employment-based lawsuits also feature disgruntled native-born
employees or applicants who sue employers for the employers' actual
or perceived preference of unauthorized workers or other foreign-born
workers.87
82. Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 4, at 1166 (citing and quoting Stephanie Chavez,
Racial Tensions Over South L.A. Jobs Grow, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 1992, at BI; Dorothy
Gilliam, A Sad, Slow but Sure Awakening, WASH. POST, May 13, 1992, at DI; Gary Lee &
Robert Suro, Latino-Black Rivalry Grows, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1993, at Al; Ben Stocking,
Side By Side: Worlds Apart (Part 2), RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, May 4, 1997, at Al; Steven
Greenhouse, Picking and Packing Portobellos, Now With a Union Contract, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 1999, at A14 (describing a successful United Farm Workers organizing campaign focusing
on Latino and African American mushroom workers); News and Notes With Ed Gordon:
Black Hotel Workers Replaced by Immigrants (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 27, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/templates/Story/Story.php?storyid=5303325; Daniel B. Wood, Rising
Black-Latino Clash on Jobs, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, May 25, 2006, at 1).
83. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 353-54.
86. Id. at 353.
87. See, e.g., Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 537-38 (6th Cir.
2008) (U.S. native-born employee brought suit against Swiss employer for favoring Swiss
foreign-bom employee); Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1997) (African-
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Scholars recognize this is especially true because the Court's
decision in Hoffman has encouraged native-born coworkers to
challenge immigrants in the workplace. 8 The current policy pits
different groups of employees against one another. 89 However,
because there is no available national origin claim for those workers or
applicants wanting to challenge an employer's practices in this regard,
the challenge would have to come in other ways, including largely
unfounded hostility and animosity towards immigrants and perceived
immigrants.
IV. CONCLUSION
Oftentimes, when the legal community engages in a discussion
about discrimination, whether in this context or in the case of sex, age,
or disability discrimination, the discussion ends with access to jobs.
The idea is that if a protected class has access to jobs, there can be no
discrimination. However, access to jobs is not the end of the
discrimination inquiry. 90 Instead, when employers have the power to
structure jobs with a particular set of employees in mind and also have
minimal restrictions placed on them in terms of "knowingly" hiring
unauthorized workers, the focus should be on employer change. As
Professor Saucedo suggests, "[o]ne possible set of changes that
employers can consider is to reduce the amount of deskilling taking
place in occupations within low-wage workplaces. It would involve
creating more worth, and less rigidity into the tasks assigned to a
particular job."91 In other words, there needs to be a legal basis upon
American worker sues for national origin discrimination); Grey v. City of Norwalk Bd. of
Educ., 304 F. Supp. 2d 314, 319, 321 (D. Conn. 2004) (African American woman brings suit
alleging national origin discrimination); Freeman v. Kansas, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1313 (D.
Kan. 2001) (African American woman brought suit claiming discrimination based on national
origin); Lemnitzer v. Phil. Airlines, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 1441, 1445 (N.D. Cal. 1992), affd in
part, rev'd in part, Lemnitzer v. Phil. Airlines, Inc., No. 92-17073, 1995 WL 230404, at *1
(9th Cir. Apr. 18, 1995) (U.S. citizens sued for national origin based on employer's preference
of Philippino workers). See also Immigration Employment Compliance Handbook § 8:8
(discussing unnamed 2003 cases in which citizen-applicant applied for job and was allegedly
refused hire because of employer's preference for unauthorized workers). Additionally, this
author handled national origin discrimination claims filed against employers by Caucasian
citizen-employees because those employers allegedly favored unauthorized workers.
88. Saucedo, Subservient Worker, supra note 40, at 969.
89. Saucedo, Addressing Segregation, supra note 3, at 495.
90. See Leticia M. Saucedo, Three Theories of Discrimination in the Brown Collar
Workplace, I U. CHI. LEGAL F. 345, 348 (2009).
91. Id.at378.
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which to challenge employers like that in the hypothetical situation
above with AFCC. 92
The sad reality is that employers are not likely to engage in this
type of change without motivation, probably in the form of significant
monetary penalties. And, because government enforcement of
immigration law has already proven to be at least under-effective, 93
something must be done to allow affected employees, whether native
born, authorized immigrant, or unauthorized worker, to recover for
employers' job structuring and employee targeting. As such, "work
authorization" needs to become a source of protection for all workers,
whether through an amendment to Title VII or otherwise. Scholars in
the area have proposed all sorts of solutions for related problems,
including an inexorable-100 inference under discrimination law,94
limited amnesty for unauthorized workers, 95 establishment of a new
protected class,96 and private attorney general status under the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act.97 However, no matter what vehicle
this change comes in, change is necessary to prevent discrimination
against every category of worker in the United States. It is not a matter
of protecting citizens, lawful immigrants, or unauthorized workers-it
is a matter of protecting every worker.
92. See supra Part I.
93. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
94. Saucedo, Addressing Segregation, supra note 3, at 449 (reasoning, "With this goal,
[this Article] proposes a Title VII segregation framework, centered on recognizing a new
inference of discrimination when all-or 100 percent of-workers in a job category are from a
protected group, the 'inexorable 100.' The inexorable 100 is the mirror image of the
'inexorable zero,' an inference of discrimination currently recognized by courts where there is
a complete absence of a protected group in a job category.").
95. Roh, supra note 18, at 266-268; Hudson & Schenck, supra note 3 at 377-379, 384-
387.
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